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in an Inflationary Climate 
Zvi Bodie and James E. Pesando 
A pensioner who receives his benefit in the form of a nominal annuity has 
claim to a stream of payments whose nominal value is certain. The real 
value  of  this  claim,  however,  will  be  highly  uncertain  if  there exists 
substantial uncertainty regarding the future level of prices. Because this 
appears to be the case,  and because pensioners are presumably con- 
cerned with the real value of their retirement incomes, the challenge of 
designing an annuity in an  inflationary climate merits increased attention. 
We believe that at least some individuals may find alternatives to the 
nominal level-payment annuity better suited to their needs or preferences 
in an environment of substantial inflation uncertainty.' If individuals are 
to make rational choices, they must first understand the risk return and 
other characteristics of  alternative annuity designs. Our primary objec- 
tive in this chapter is to clarify these issues. 
The first task is to examine the streams of real benefits that are likely to 
be provided by variable  annuities (VAs). Although equity-based VAs 
appear to have fallen into some disfavor, perhaps because of the inherent 
volatility of  common stocks, recent work by Bodie (1980,1982) suggests 
that VAs tied to bills or short-term bonds may produce income streams 
that are quite stable in real terms. Therefore we examine VAs backed by 
bills, long-term bonds, common stocks, and a mixed portfolio and com- 
pare the results with those for a graduated payment, nominal annuity. 
Our second task is to examine more recent annuity designs in which 
floors or floors-plus-ceilings have been added to the standard VA. The 
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Rockefeller Foundation plan, for example, provides cost-of-living ad- 
justments which equal the average prime interest rate for the year less 3% 
(Heaton 1977). Once granted, these adjustments are never reduced and 
thus the annuitant-in  effect-has  a VA subject to a nominal  floor.‘ 
Annuities provided by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
(TIAA) also have a guaranteed nominal fl00r.~  In recent years, large 
firms in both Canada and the United States have frequently made ad hoc 
cost-of-living adjustments to the pensions of retired workers. In Canada, 
these adjustments have often been financed from pension fund earnings 
in excess of  the plan’s valuation rate (Pesando 1981).‘ Once granted, 
these adjustments are permanent. Moreover, there appears to  be  a 
ceiling on these adjustments in that the real value of the initial benefit is 
never increased even if  “excess”  fund earnings might  so permit. The 
second part of the chapter thus examines a variable annuity subject to a 
nominal floor (VAF) and a variable annuity subject to a nominal floor 
and a real ceiling (VAFC). The former is suggested by the Rockefeller 
plan, and both may be viewed as an attempt to formalize the apparent 
practice of  many firms in granting cost-of-living adjustments to retired 
plan members. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The performance of  a nominal, 
level-payment  annuity  is  first contrasted  with  that of  a  hypothetical 
purchasing power annuity for the period 1971-80.  The latter is formally 
equivalent to a VA backed by an index bond yielding a certain real return 
of 0%. Theoretical distributions of  the real payments from VAs tied to 
alternative  asset  bases  are then presented and serve to illustrate the 
nature of  the trade-off  between risk and expected real returns. These 
payments are  also  contrasted with  those  provided  by  a  graduated- 
payment, nominal annuity. The properties of  VAFs are then explored, 
and simulations are conducted to contrast their performance with VAs 
backed by identical asset portfolios. The same exercise is then repeated 
for VAFCs. To place the alternative annuity designs in a final perspec- 
tive, a historical simulation is conducted for the period 1971-80. The final 
section is a summary and conclusion. 
11.1  The Level-Payment, Nominal Annuity 
The nominal and real values of  the benefits provided by a nominal, 
level-payment annuity during the period 1971-80 are illustrated in table 
1  I.  1. The annuity is purchased at the beginning of  1971 for the sum of 
$100,000, the annuity is sold at a (nominal) interest rate of 7.5%, and the 
benefits are payable with certainty for 10 years.’ The real value of  the 
annual, nominal payment declines by more than 50% during the decade. 
Further, it is likely that a substantial portion of this decline was unantici- 
pated. If the anticipated rate of inflation embodied in the nominal rate of Table 11.1  Illustration of Traditional, Level-Payment Annuity and 
Purchasing Power Annunity for Period  1971-80 
Purchasing Power Annuityb 
Traditional Annuity"  No Tilting (RV=O)  Tilting (RV=5) 
Inflation  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 

















































































'Assumes that the nominal interest rate is 7.5%, initial capital is $100,000,  annuity is payable with certainty for 10 years, and annuity payments are made at 
the end of  the year. 
bAssumes a real interest rate of  zero. If  TI is the inflation rate in period r, then the nominal annuity payment B,= B,-  * (1 +  m,)/(I +  RV)  where RVis the 
interest rate used to determine the base annuity payment (B");  Bo  equals RV * A/[ 1 -  (1 +  RV)  '1 where A is the initial capital; and Tis the number of  years 
the annuity is payable. For RV=O, Bo equals AIT. 294  Zvi Bodie/James E. Pesando 
interest was 5% then the annuitant would have expected the real value of 
his benefit to decline at about 5% per year.6  Deviations around this rate of 
decline would then have been unanticipated. 
For illustrative purposes, the performance of  a PPA for the period 
1971-80  is also shown in table 11.1. This annuity is fully linked to the 
consumer price index and is sold at a certain real return of 0%. Earlier 
work by Bodie (1980) indicates that the minimum-variance portfolio (in 
the absence of short selling) consists of  one-month Treasury bills hedged 
with commodity futures and that the expected real return on this port- 
folio would not exceed 0%. We assume for simplicity that a portfolio 
could be constructed which would provide a certain real return of  0%. 
The PPA is analytically equivalent to a VA tied to an index bond which 
provides this certain real return. 
Although the stream of real payments provided by the PPA is certain, 
there is no requirement that this stream of payments be constant. If RVis 
the annuity valuation rate used to determine the base value of the annuity 
payment, and if  r is the certain real return on the portfolio, then the real 
value of the annuity payments will change with certainty at an annual rate 
equal to (1 + r)/(l + RV) -  1. (See Appendix for details.) With r = 0 and 
RV = 5, the real benefit declines with certainty at 4.76%  per year, as 
shown in table 11.1. When r and RV  are equal, there is no tilt to the 
projected stream of real annuity payments. If the real return is uncertain, 
the previous expression depicts the expected degree of tilting in the real 
payments  stream. If  pensioners  wish  to design  a  stream  of  pension 
payments which is expected to decline  in  real  terms, perhaps due to 
liquidity constraints or estate motives, this is readily accomplished with 
vehicles other than the nominal, level-payment annuity. The downward 
tilt in the real benefit provided by a nominal, level-payment annuity is, of 
course, equal to the expected rate of inflation. 
11.2  Variable Annuities with Alternative Asset Bases 
The limitations of  fixed-dollar  annuities  in  an inflationary  climate 
prompted life insurance companies in the 1950s to offer equity-based 
VAs. As emphasized by Bodie (1980), however, an equity-based VA 
exposes the annuitant to substantial investment risk even if it is assumed 
that the real return on equities is unaffected by unanticipated changes in 
the rate of  inflation.’ The purpose of  this section is to explore the real 
income streams provided by VAs with alternative asset bases. 
Theoretical distributions are presented in table 11.2 for the real ben- 
efits provided by VAs backed by one-month Treasury bills, long-term 
United States  government bonds, common stocks, and a mixed portfolio. 
(The mechanics of a variable annuity are detailed in the Appendix.) The 
mixed portfolio is the minimum variance portfolio with  the same ex- Table 11.2  Variable Annunities with Alternative Asset Bases: 
Theoretical Distributions 
Expected  Standard  Annuity  Base  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment 
Real  Devia-  Valu-  Annuity  In Year 5  in Year 10  in Year 15 
Returnd  tion  ation  Payment" 
Portfolio  (%)  (%)  Rate (%)  ($1  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D. 
Bills  0  1.52  0  6,667  6,667  6,670  227  6,667  6,674  321  6,667  6,678  393 
Bills  0  1.04  0  6,667  6,667  6,677  361  6,667  6,701  679  6,667  6,731  933 
(serial 
correlation)' 
Bonds  2.956  7.64  3  8,377  8,377  8,500  1,463  8,377  8,625  2,115  8,377  8,752  2,647 
Stocks  7.232  18.61  7.5  11,329  11,329  12,354  5,372  11,329  13,471  8,666  11,329  14,689  12,974 
Mixed  2.956  6.08  3  8,377  8,377  8,455  1,155  8,377  8,533  1,656  8,377  8,613  2,056 
portfoliod 
Graduated 




rate =  8%) 
"Mean of  the logarithm of  the real annual wealth relative. Annuity valuation rate in column 4 is the equivalent annual rate 
"Initial capital is $100,000. annual payments are made with certainty for 15 years and are reported in constant dollars. 
'Based on the following autoregression for the annual real return on bills: r,= .76r,_ I +e, with ue=  1.04% per year and ro=O 
dMixed portfolio, consisting of  bonds (52%), bills (29%), and stocks (19%), minimizes the variance of  the annual real return for the given mean 
'Uncertainty  regarding the real annuity payments stems solely from uncertainty regarding the price level, which is assumed to be log normally distributed. 
The continuously compounded  rate of  inflation (7)  follows the following autoregressive process: TI,=  .77+   TI,+, + Ut with uLT=  2.00% per year and 
no=  7.7%. The steady-state inflation rate of 7.7% is equivalent to the annual graduation rate of  8%. The graduated-payment nominal annuity assumes an 
expected real return equal to that of  bonds (i.e., 2.956%). 296  Zvi BodieIJames E. Pesando 
pected return as the long-term bond portfolio." The VAs are purchased 
for $100,000 and benefits are paid with certainty for 15 years. The real 
returns on bills, bonds, and stocks are assumed to be lognormally dis- 
tributed with  means of  zero, 2.956%, and 7.232%, respectively,  and 
standard deviations of  1.5296, 7.64%, and 18.61%. The means are the 
continuous time equivalents of  annual returns of  0%, 3%, and 7.5%. 
These parameters, together with the covariances necessary to construct 
the mixed portfolio, are based on historical data for the period 1953-80.9 
The valuation  rates used  to determine the base  level  of  the annuity 
payments are the annual equivalents of the continuously compounded 
real rates of return. Examination of the historical data indicates that real 
bill returns, but not those on stocks and bonds, are serially correlated.'" 
For this reason, the theoretical distribution of real benefit payments is 
also calculated for a bills-based  VA on the assumption that real bill 
returns are serially correlated. 
The assumption that real returns are lognormally distributed implies 
that annuity payments are lognormally distributed also. Since the valua- 
tion rates used to calculate the base values of the benefits are the annual 
equivalents of the expected real returns on the portfolios, median benefit 
payments show no tendency to rise or to fall over time." Because these 
payments  are lognormally distributed, they exhibit positive skewness and 
thus the mean payments rise steadily over time. The distribution of real 
benefits provided by a graduated-payment, nominal annuity is also in- 
cluded in table 11.2. For this annuity, all of the uncertainty regarding the 
real value of  the benefit payments stems from price-level  uncertainty. 
Thus, an additional set of  assumptions is required. The price level is 
assumed  to  be  1ognormalIy distributed,  and  the  continuously  com- 
pounded rate of inflation is assumed to follow the first-order autoregres- 
sive process which  characterizes the period  1953-80.''  The degree of 
graduation is set equal to 8%, which is the (annual) steady-state rate of 
inflation implied by the autoregres~ion.'~  The purpose of  including the 
graduated, nominal annuity is to emphasize the fact that while its nominal 
payments are devoid of  risk, its real payments are not. 
The  distributions of real benefit payments reported in table 11.2  mirror 
the risk-return characteristics of the underlying portfolios. The stream of 
real benefits provided by the bills-based VA is smaller and more stable 
than the stream provided by the bonds-based VA, and so on. Recogni- 
tion of the serial correlation in bill returns produces a riskier stream of 
benefit payments, especially as the time horizon increases. Even when 
this serial correlation is acknowledged, however, bills remain the corner- 
stone of any VA which is intended to limit uncertainty regarding the real 
value of benefit payments. The importance of diversification is seen in the 
comparison  of  the bonds-based  VA, with  the VA tied  to the mixed 
portfolio with the same expected return. Although the median benefits 297  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
are identical, the standard deviation of the real benefit payment in the 
fifteenth year is 22% smaller for the VA tied to the mixed portfolio. 
Note, finally,  the  real  benefit  stream provided  by  the graduated- 
payment, nominal annuity. We assume that the implicit expected real 
return is 3% (at an annual rate) and is thus equal to the expected real 
return on long-term government  bond^.'^ This assumption is equivalent 
to assuming that life companies can hedge graduated-payment,  nominal 
annuities by holding an appropriate sequence of  long-term bonds and 
that competitive pressures ensure that this is the implicit real yield at 
which these annuities are sold. Because of the 3% return assumption, the 
median benefits are identical to  those for the VAs tied to the government 
bond and mixed portfolios. The standard deviation of the benefits pro- 
vided by the nominal annuity is less than those for either of  the VAs in 
year 5 but significantly exceeds them by year number 10. 
The  significant increase in the riskiness of real benefits provided by the 
nominal annuity as the annuitant ages merits emphasis. This is a direct 
reflection of  the substantial serial correlation in the inflation rate. These 
results, especially as the annuitant ages, illustrate how inappropriate it is 
to  argue that VAs are inferior to nominal annuities because they transfer 
all of the investment risk to the annuitant. The results also highlight the 
importance of acknowledging the serial correlation in inflation rates in 
attempting any assessment of  the risk of  the real benefits provided by 
nominal annuities. 
11.3  Variable Annuities with Nominal Floors 
As noted, the Rockefeller  Foundation  Plan  provides  retiring  em- 
ployees with a variable annuity subject to a nominal floor, or VAF. Sun 
Life Insurance Company of Canada has recently introduced a VAF, tied 
to Treasury bills, in which excess earnings above 3% are also used to 
provide permanent benefit enrichments. The nominal floor in each of 
these cases is equivalent to the plan sponsor’s guaranteeing that the fund 
will earn a nominal rate of  at least 3%. If the fund earns less than 3% in a 
given period, the plan sponsor fully absorbs the loss. (The mechanics of a 
VAF and the contrast to a standard VA are detailed in the Appendix.) 
The pension plans provided by most large firms in the United States 
(and Canada) are defined-benefit plans. In them the employee typically 
receives a benefit equal to a given fraction of  his average or  final earnings 
for each year of  service. Although the promised benefits are nominal, 
firms-especially in Canada-have  typically granted ad hoc cost-of-living 
adjustments to the pensions of  retired employees. Once made, these 
adjustments tend to be permanent. Thus the nominal value of the pen- 
sion benefit is never reduced even if  the fund performs poorly. This is, of 
course, what happens explicitly under the Rockefeller Foundation Plan, 298  Zvi Bodie/James E. Pesando 
which functions as an ordinary defined-benefit plan during the preretire- 
ment period. 
If the source of these adjustments is pension fund earnings in excess of 
the plan’s valuation rate, and if there is no ceiling on the size of the benefit 
increases, then the plan member effectively owns a VA with a guaranteed 
nominal floor, or a VAF. Equivalently, he is provided with a traditional 
VA plus a put option on the nominal investment earnings of the pension 
assets with a striking price equal to the plan’s valuation rate. The  plan’s 
valuation rate becomes the equivalent of  the valuation rate used to  set the 
basepayment  in a standard VA. If the nominal return on the pension fund 
is less than this valuation rate, then the nominal benefit is unchanged and 
the shortfall is absorbed fully by the plan sponsor. 
Let A represent the initial amount in the fund, RV  the valuation rate, 
and cr(l)  the measure of the risk of the nominal return that is relevant to 
option pricing. The value (AVAF)  of  the VAF is 
(1)  AVAF  = A + put [A,  RV, u(R)]. 
For a given A,  the value of the put option is an increasing function of both 
RV  and u(l). If the fund is invested exclusively in the risk-free nominal 
asset and thus earns the certain nominal return Rf, the value of the put 
option is zero as long as RVS  Rr.  On  the other hand, the value of the put 
option is  likely to be large if  the nominal return on the pension assets is 
very uncertain, even if  RV is well below the expected nominal return on 
these assets. If  the objective of the plan sponsor were to minimize the 
value of  the put option,  he would wish to set a low RVand choose an asset 
base which would effectively make the VAF into a standard VA. If  the 
sole objective of  the employee were to maximize the value of the put 
option, he would-of course-prefer  that the funds be invested in the 
riskiest asset, or common stocks. As the employee presumably cannot 
sell his VAF, he might nonetheless prefer that the fund not be invested in 
risky assets if he wishes the real retirement income provided by the VAF 
to be stable. This point is examined below. 
Simulation results (1,000 trials) are presented in table 11.3 for VAFs 
tied both to bills and to the mixed portfolio described previously. The 
interest in bills reflects the fact that they represent the cornerstone of any 
low-risk stream of  real annuity payments. Still-active workers may have 
enough flexibility  to vary their consumption-saving  and  work-leisure 
decisions; thus they can assume considerable investment risk. This is less 
likely  to be the case  for  retired workers.  The interest  in  the mixed 
portfolio stems from the desire to monitor-in  effect-the  value of  the 
put option when the uncertainty in the return on pension assets is in- 
creased. Because the value of  this option depends on the nominal return 
on the pension fund, simulations are performed for both a low-inflation 
(3%) and a high-inflation (9%) scenario. The nominal return is equal to Table 11.3  Variable Annuities with Guaranteed Nominal Floors 
Expected  Standard  Infla-  Annuity  Base  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment 
Real  Devia-  tion  Valu-  Annuity  In Year 5  in Year 10  in Year 15 
Return"  tion  Rate  ation  Paymentb 
Portfolio  (%)  (%I  (%)  Rate (%) ($)  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D. 




Mixed'  2.956  6.08  93  8,377  8,473 
(8,407) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  38  11,683  10,787 
(9,192) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  98  11,683  9,586 
(9,226) 
Bills  0  1.52  93  8,377  7,221 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  33  8,377  8,851 
7,447  150 
(7,223)  (245) 
7,334  248 
(7,224)  (248) 
8,943  928 
(8,448)  (1,180) 
8,564  1,120 
(8,489)  (1,176) 
10,948  747 
(9,289)  (1,225) 
9,701  1,035 
(9,276)  (1,263) 
6,619  188 
(6,222)  (302) 
6,229  312 
(6,229)  (312) 
9,616  1,434 
(8,595)  (1,687) 
8,738  1,589 
(8,577)  (1,655) 
10,276  997 
(7,446)  (1,407) 
8,070  1,190 













5,888  204 
(5,375)  (313) 
5,373  322 
(5,373)  (322) 
10,326  1,976 
(8,724)  (2,139) 
8,918  1,974 
(8,671)  (2,047) 
9,629  1,129 
(5,922)  (1,339) 
6,706)  1,299 
(5,879)  (1,370) 
Note:  Results in parentheses are those for a variable annuity without the nominal floor. 
"Mean  of  the logarithm of the real annual wealth relative. The nominal return is the sum of  the simulated real return plus the continuous time equivalent of 
the annual inflation rate noted in the table. 
hInitial capital is $100,000, annual payments are made with certainty for 15 years, payments are in constant dollars. 
'Same  as in table 11.2. 300  Zvi BodidJames E. Pesando 
the sum of the stochastic real return and the continuous time equivalent 
of these two inflation rates. Both low (3%) and high (8%) valuation rates 
are included in the simulations for the VAF tied to the mixed portfolio. 
When the inflation rate is 3%, the expected real return of zero on the 
bills portfolio implies an expected nominal return of  3%. Because the 
valuation rate is  also 3%, the floor frequently binds and thus the put 
option is frequently exercised. The result is that benefits have a higher 
median and a lower standard deviation than do those provided  by  the 
corresponding VA. When the inflation rate rises to 9%, the floor never 
binds and the result  is identical to that for the VA. This result occurs 
because the combination of the high (expected) nominal return relative 
to the valuation rate and the low standard deviation of bill returns ensures 
that the realized nominal return always exceeds the valuation rate. Note 
also that the expected real return of zero together with the valuation rate 
of 3%  causes the stream of real benefits to be tilted downward. This is 
most easily seen for the VA, but it occurs for the VAF as well. 
When the inflation rate rises from 3% to 9%, the put option is occa- 
sionally exercised for the mixed portfolio. This is a direct result of  its 
more uncertain return. When the valuation rate (again, the interest rate 
used to set the base payment) is raised for a standard  VA, the sole effect is 
to tilt  the real  payments  stream downward  relative  to what  it would 
otherwise have been. When the valuation rate is raised for a VAF, it has 
the additional effect of  raising the value of  the put option. When the 
valuation rate is raised to 8%, which is typical of the rates now used to 
value defined-benefit plans in the United States, the striking price of the 
option rises accordingly. The result is a dramatic rise in the value of the 
put option in the low-inflation scenario. With an expected nominal return 
of  3 + 3 = 6%, the nominal return typically falls short of  the valuation 
rate. By the fifteenth year, the median real benefit is 65% greater than 
that provided by the corresponding VA. In the high-inflation scenario, 
the effective value of  the put option falls sharply as realized  nominal 
returns fall short of  the valuation rate with much lower frequency. 
It is interesting to note that proponents of the Rockefeller Foundation 
Plan, which functions like a VAF, emphasize the importance of investing 
the pension fund reserve for retired employees exclusively in short-term 
commercial paper. If  the nominal interest rate on short-term securities 
remains high relative to the plan’s valuation rate of 3%, the value of the 
put option which distinguishes the VAF from a traditional VA will be 
very small. In effect, the Rockefeller Foundation  Plan will have been 
transformed from a defined-benefit plan in the preretirement period to a 
defined-contribution plan at the date of retirement, with the plan’s valua- 
tion rate of 3% used to capitalize the nominal benefits due at the date of 
the employee’s retirement. If inflation were to recede and thus short-term 
interest rates to fall, the value of the put option would increase. Thus the 301  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
annuitants stand to gain and the plan stands to lose from a reduction in 
the rate of inflation. 
It is also interesting to note the continued emphasis in policy discus- 
sions in  Canada on investing pension  fund reserves held  for  retired 
employees exclusively in short-term securities if excess earnings are to be 
used  to provide  cost-of-living protection. Since the VAF is  virtually 
identical to a VA when the value of the put option is small, the use of ad 
hoc adjustments  may simply reflect the metamorphosis of defined-benefit 
into defined-contribution plans as the market response to increased infla- 
tion uncertainty (Pesando 1982). Because most large firms had already 
introduced defined-benefit plans, the use of  VAFs-rendered  virtually 
identical to VAs by the combination of  low valuation rates and invest- 
ments concentrated in short-term securities-may  be the most conve- 
nient way to effect the metamorphosi~.'~ 
11.4  Variable Annuities with Nominal Floors and 
(Cumulative) Real Ceilings 
In the preceding section, it was assumed that firms which provide ad 
hoc cost-of-living adjustments could be regarded as providing their em- 
ployees with VAFs. Although this may well be true for some firms, the 
reality may also be more complicated. Firms which make ad hoc cost-of- 
living adjustments may impose a ceiling on such increases and may also 
bank underwriting losses (when the nominal floor binds) as a first claim 
on future excess earnings. In citing options for pension reform in Canada, 
the Task Force (1979) considered an excess interest scheme which con- 
tained a cumulative real ceiling. The real value of  any enriched pension 
could  not  exceed its initial  level,  and  any excess earnings above the 
amount necessary to preserve fully the real value of the pension would be 
banked against future investment shortfalls. In addition, any underwrit- 
ing  losses  incurred  by  the plan  sponsor  by  virtue  of  the guaranteed 
nominal floor would be banked, would accumulate at a market rate of 
interest, and would represent a prior claim on future excess earnings. 
Only after any accumulated losses borne by the plan sponsor were repaid 
would excess earnings be used to enrich pensions in pay. Significantly, 
this illustrative scheme was chosen for study after the federal government 
solicited input from both firms and members of  the employee benefits 
industry. 
The most important feature of a VAFC relative to a VAF  is its banking 
provisions.  (This is perhaps most easily seen by considering the case in 
which there is a real floor equal to the initial benefit. In this case, the 
annuity would be constant in real terms and the banking provisions would 
mirror the underwriting experience of  a plan sponsor who provided a 
fully indexed  pension  and held  assets other than index bonds in  the 302  Zvi BodieIJames E. Pesando 
pension fund.) Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the options inherent 
in a VAFC without reference to the banking provisions. By virtue of  the 
ceiling  on the real value of  the pension  benefit,  the worker  has-in 
effect-sold  a  call  option  on investment  earnings in  excess of  those 
sufficient to provide full cost-of-living protection. Because the nominal 
return on the plan’s assets is the real return plus the inflation rate, this is 
equivalent to the worker’s having sold a call option on real investment 
earnings in excess of the valuation rate. Let  AVAFC represent the value of 
the variable annuity subject to both a floor and a ceiling; let u(f)  be the 
measure of risk of the real return that is relevant to option pricing, and let 
AVAF  and A be as defined in (1).  Then 
(2)  AVAFC  =A  + put [A,  RV, u(E)] -  call [A,  RV, u(F)] 
=  AVAF -  call [A,  RV, u(iT)]. 
Unlike a VAF, whose value to the beneficiary is at least as great as that of 
a standard VA, the value of a VAFC may be greater or less than that of 
the corresponding VA, depending on the relative values of  the put and 
the call. For a given A,  the value of  the call option is a decreasing function 
of  the plan’s valuation rate and an increasing function of the risk of  the 
real return on the plan’s assets. The value of the call option will be zero if 
the pension fund is invested exclusively in a risk-free real asset and if  the 
risk-free real rate of return ys  RV. As noted by Bodie (1980), there is no 
risk-free  real asset. A  pension fund invested exclusively in  bills will, 
however,  earn a real  return which  is  quite stable and  which  has  an 
expected value of (approximately) zero. The value of  this call option will 
thus be close to  zero if (1)  the fund holds only bills or their equivalent and 
(2) the valuation rate is above, say, 3%.16 In this case, the value of  the 
VAFC will equal that of the VAF. If, in addition, the anticipated rate of 
inflation is sufficiently high that the nominal bill yield significantly ex- 
ceeds RV, then the value of  the put option contained in both the VAF 
and the VAFC will equal zero and thus both will be equal in value to the 
corresponding VA. 
Consider  first  (table 11.4) the distribution of  real  benefits under a 
VAFC tied to a bills portfolio when the inflation rate is low. Because the 
projected stream of real annuity payments is tilted downward (since the 
expected real return of zero is less then the valuation rate), the ceiling 
binds rarely and only in the initial years of the annuity payout. Median 
benefits fall short of  those provided  by  a VAF, primarily  due to the 
banking provisions,  but  exceed  those of  a VA. In the high-inflation 
scenario,  the VAFC provides benefits which simply reproduce those of a 
VA. This result, which was anticipated in the discussion of (2), may be 
empirically relevant. If so, this might explain the apparent lack of  atten- 
tion that is sometimes accorded to this issue. The Rockefeller Foundation 
plan, for example,  makes no reference as to whether or not a ceiling exists Table 11.4  Variable Annuities with Guaranteed Nominal Floors and Cumulative Real Ceilings 
Expected  Standard  Infla-  Annuity  Base  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment  Annuity Payment 
Real  Devia-  tion  Valu-  Annuity  In Year 5  in Year 10  in Year 15 
Return"  tion  Rate  ation  Paymentb 
Portfolio  (%)  (%I  (%)  Rate (%) ($)  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D.  Median  Mean  S.D. 
Bills  0  1.52  33  8,377  7,314 
(7,219) 
Bills  0  1.52  93  8,377  7,221 
(7,221) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  33  8,377  8,377 
(8,366) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  93  8,377  8,377 
(8,400) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  38  11,683  10,106 
(9,182) 
Mixed'  2.956  6.08  98  11,683  9,257 
(9,226) 
7,360  151 
(7,223)  (245) 
7,224  248 
(7,224)  (248) 
8,080  393 
(8,448)  (1,180) 
7,995  585 
(8,489)  (1,176) 
10,399  462 
(9,289)  (1,226) 
9,372  1,129 













5,543  187 
(5,375)  (313) 
5,373  322 
(5,373)  (322) 
7,725  973 
(8,724)  (2,139) 
7,806  971 
(8,671)  (2,049) 
7,834  561 
(5,922)  (1,339) 
5,746)  1,470 
(5,879)  (1,370) 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are those for a variable annuity without the floor and ceiling. 
"Mean of  the logarithm of  the real annual wealth relative. The nominal return is the sum of the simulated real return plus the continuous time equivalent of 
the annual inflation rate noted in the table. 
bInitial capital is $100,000, annual payments are made with certainty for 15 years, payments are in constant dollars. 
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on the cost-of-living increases. Because the valuation rate of 3%  exceeds 
the expected real return on a portfolio of  short-term commercial paper 
(or its surrogate, the prime rate), the question of whether or not there is a 
ceiling may simply not be empirically relevant. 
For the mixed portfolio with a valuation rate of 3%, there is no tilt to 
the projected stream of real benefits provided by the corresponding VA. 
For the VAFC, unlike the VAF, the benefit payments are similar in both 
the low- and the high-inflation scenarios. This is, of  course, due to the 
banking provisions. For both scenarios, the ceiling binds frequently (i.e., 
the call option is exercised), as evidenced by the fact that median benefits 
remain at the ceiling in all years. Although we do not attempt to  evaluate 
them explicitly, it would appear that the value of the sponsor’s call option 
exceeds the value of the annuitant’s put in these two cases. Note that the 
median and mean benefits are lower than those of the corresponding VA 
in all years. Furthermore, in contrast to both the VA and the VAF, the 
mean benefit for the VAFC is well below its own median, reflecting the 
reverse  skewness  induced  by  the truncation  of  the upper tail  of  the 
distribution. The dramatic decline in the standard deviation relative to 
both the VA and the VAF  is also a result of this truncation and therefore 
reflects, not a reduction in risk from the annuitant’s perspective, but the 
loss of upside potential. Further evidence that in these two cases the value 
of the VAFC is considerably less than that of  the corresponding VA is 
provided by table 11.5,  which shows the distribution of the real accumula- 
tion in the “bank” at the end of year 15. When this number turns out to be 
positive at the end of a simulation run, it means that the years of  “excess” 
earnings from the portfolio were more than enough to compensate for the 
years of  shortfall. 
Raising the valuation rate, as noted in the discussion of (2), reduces the 
value of  the call option. When the valuation rate is set at 8%, median 
benefits do exceed those provided by the VA for all years in the low- 
inflation scenario, although they remain less than those provided by the 
VAF. When inflation is high, and thus the permitted real erosion in the 
value of  benefits is also high, the stream of  payments provided by the 
VAFC and the VA are quite similar. The ceiling frequently binds, but the 
excess funds  so  banked  are then  used  to enrich  nominal  benefits  in 
subsequent years. 
To sum up, three empirical results merit emphasis. First, if the pension 
fund is  invested  exclusively  in bills,  the  VAFC will  provide  benefits 
similar to those provided by a standard VA if (1)  the inflation rate is high 
relative to the plan’s valuation rate and (2) the valuation rate is, say, 3% 
or  more and thus significantly exceeds the expected real return on bills. In 
this case, the value of  each of the put and the call options is approximately 
equal to zero. Second,  when the expected real return on the plan’s assets 
is equal to the valuation rate, the real benefits provided by a VAFC are Table 11.5  Amount in ‘‘Bank’’ at End of Year 15 for VAFCs in Table 11.4 
Amount in Bank ($) 
Expected  Standard  Inflation 
Real Return  Deviation  Rate  RV  Standard 
Portfolio  (%)  (%)  (%I  (%)  Median  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Deviation 
Bills  0  1.52  3  3  -  1,800  -  2,209  -9,421  0  1,787 
Bills  0  1.52  9  3  0  0  0  0  0 
Mixed  2.956  6.08  3  3  2,591  10,024  -  23,458  122,557  16,933 
Mixed  2.956  6.08  9  3  3,381  10,898  1,408  127,940  15,459 
Mixed  2.956  6.08  3  8  -  23,836  -24,112  -61,225  17,841  12,835 
Mixed  2.956  6.08  9  8  -  63  -  770  -  13,194  2,988  1,649 306  Zvi BodieIJames E. Pesando 
likely to be far more stable than those provided by either a VAF or the 
traditional VA. This result, in essence, reflects the procedure for banking 
the gains or losses experienced by the plan sponsor. Third, by choosing 
appropriate combinations of  RV and asset allocations, it would appear 
possible to cancel the values of the put and the call (without setting each 
equal to zero) and to create a number of VAFCs all having a value equal 
to A. But the sponsor and annuitant would have to agree on the port- 
folio’s composition, and there would have to be some mechanism for 
monitoring adherence to it. 
As noted, our interest in the VAFC is motivated by the possibility that 
it may formalize the behavior of  at least some firms which make ad hoc 
cost-of-living adjustments. If  so, and if  the stream of  real payments is 
smoothed relative to those obtainable from, say, a bills-based VA, then 
firms must be compensated for their underwriting the attendant invest- 
ment risk. In principle, this should be reflected in compensating wage 
differentials. Because the VAFC does not alter the efficient frontier, it 
will be the basic risk-return trade-offs available in the capital market 
which dictate the size of these compensating wage differentials. 
11.5  Alternative Annuity Designs: Historical Simulations 
for the Period 1971-80 
Historical simulations of  the nominal and real benefits provided by 
VAs, VAFs, and VAFCs for the period 1971-80 are presented in table 
11.6partsA-D. Asin  table 11.1,  theinitialcapital in 1971  is$100,000and 
the payments are made with certainty for 10 years. Of course, VAFs and 
VAFCs must  be underwritten  by  the plan sponsor (or life insurance 
company) and their cost may exceed or fall short of  the initial capital.” 
Two valuation rates, 0% and 5% ,  are used in the simulations. The  former 
is the expected real return on the minimum variance portfolio (i.e., bills) 
while the latter is typical of the rates actually used in the early 1970s to 
value defined-benefit plans. 
Consider first the bill results. When the valuation rate is zero, the real 
benefit provided by the VA declines from $10,100 in 1971 to $8,794 in 
1980-that  is, by 13%.  This erosion is only modest in view of the substan- 
tial unanticipated inflation that appears to have occurred in the 1970s. 
Because the floor never binds, the VAF produces benefits identical to 
those produced by the VA. Because the ceiling binds in 1971 and 1972, 
thus causing excess earnings to be banked for future use, the real benefits 
provided by the VAFC diverge from those provided by the VA and VAF. 
With a valuation rate of 596,  the floor binds twice (1971 and 1972) so that 
the final benefit provided by the VAF exceeds that provided by the VA. 
Because of  the banking feature, which requires that the plan sponsor be 307  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
compensated for prior underwriting losses, the stream of  benefits pro- 
vided by the VAFC differs from that provided by the VA. 
The sharpest contrast among the alternative annuity designs occurs 
with the riskiest asset base, which is common stocks. Consider only the 
results when the valuation rate equals 5%. Although this rate is less than 
the expected  real rate of  return on common stocks, the real benefits 
provided by the VA, in fact, decline sharply. This result simply reflects 
the poor performance of the stock market during the decade. The value 
of  the nominal floor (i.e.,  the put option) is high as evidenced by the fact 
that the real benefit provided by  the VAF in 1980 is almost twice that 
provided by the VA. The tendency for the VAFC to stabilize the real 
stream of  benefit payments is readily apparent. In 1973 and 1974, for 
example, annuitants are partially insulated from the precipitous declines 
in the stock market. When the stock market recovers in 1975, however, 
real benefits continue to decline as excess fund earnings are first used to 
repay the plan sponsors for the net underwriting losses they incurred in 
the previous years. 
The final comparison is between the bond portfolio and the mixed 
portfolio with the identical expected return. Because of the very adverse 
performance of the bond market, the real benefit by 1980 is much higher 
for the VA when it is tied to the mixed portfolio. This ex post result is 
consistent with the greater ex ante risk of the bond portfolio. The com- 
parisons of  the results for the VAs, VAFs, and VAFCs are quite straight- 
forward, and only the continuing tendency for real benefits to be stabil- 
ized under the VAFC merits note. 
11.6  Summary and Conclusion 
Nominal annuities, whether level payment or graduated, expose the 
annuitant to substantial uncertainty about the real value of his retirement 
income. This is because he is uncertain of the future level of prices and 
hence of the future rate of  inflation. Standard VAs backed by Treasury 
bills or their equivalent provide much more stable real retirement in- 
comes, even when consideration is given to the serial correlation in real 
bill  returns.  VAs backed  by  common  stocks, long-term government 
bonds, and a mixed portfolio illustrate the risk-return trade-offs inherent 
in the alternative portfolios. These should be of interest to plan sponsors 
who may wish, without increasing their own costs, to provide increased 
annuity choices to plan members.'" 
The cost of  a VAF, which is a VA with a nominal floor, is not known 
with certainty on the date the annuity is purchased and must be under- 
written by a plan sponsor or life company. The plan provided by the 
Rockefeller Foundation functions, in effect, like a VAF. If the objective Table 11.6  Alternative Annuity Designs 
Variable Annuity" 
Infla- 
tion  RV=0  RV=5 
Rate  Nominal 
Year  (%)"  Return  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
Variable Annuity  variable Annuity 
with Nominal Floor  with Nominal Floor, Real Ceiling 
RV=O  KV=5  RV=O  RV=5 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
A.  Simulations for a bil1.s-only portfolio,  197140 
1971  3.36  4.39  10.439  10,100  12.876 
1972  3.41  3.84  10,840  10,142  12,733 
1973  8.80  6.93  11,591  9,967  32,968 
1974  12.20  8.00  12,518  9,594  13,337 
1975  7.01  5.80  13,245  9,486  13,439 
1976  4.81  5.08  13,917  9,510  13,449 
1977  6.77  5.12  14,629  9,363  13,465 
1978  9.03  7.03  15,657  9,191  13,726 
1979  13.31  10.38  17,284  8,954  14,429 
1980  12.41  10.40  19,082  8,794  15,170 
B. Simulations for a stocks-only portfolio, 1971MO 
1971  3.36  14.31  11.431  11,059  14,098 
1972  3.41  18.98  13,601  12,725  15,976 
1973  8.80  -14.66  11,607  9,981  12,985 
1974  12.20  -26.48  8,533  6,540  9,092 
1975  7.01  37.20  11,708  8,385  11,879 
1976  4.81  23.84  14,499  9,908  14,012 
1978  9.03  6.39  14.318  8,405  12,550 
1979  13.31  18.44  16,958  8,785  14,157 
1980  12.41  32.01  22,386  10,317  17,797 




















































































































































































6,379 C. Simularions for a U.S.  -bonds-only portfolio, 197140 
1971  3.36  13.23  11,322  10,954  13,966 
1972  3.41  5.68  11,966  11,195  14,056 
1974  12.20  4.35  12,348  9,464  13,156 
1975  7.01  9.19  13,484  9,657  13,680 
1976  4.81  16.75  15,742  10.757  15,212 
1977  6.77  -0.67  15,636  10,007  14,391 
1978  9.03  1.03  15,797  9,273  13,847 
1973  8.80  -1.11  11,834  10,176  13,239 
1979  13.31  -1.22  15,605  8,084  13,026 
1980  12.41  -4.45  14,911  6,872  11,854 
D. Simulations for a  U.S. mixed portfolio:  1971-80 
1971  3.36  10.89  11,089  10,729  13,678 
1972  3.41  7.70  11,943  11,174  14,030 
1973  8.80  -1.40  11,777  10,127  13,175 
1974  12.20  -0.52  11,716  8,979  12,483 
1975  7.01  13.59  13,308  9,531  13,503 
1976  4.81  14.75  15,271  10,435  14,758 
1977  6.77  -0.25  15,233  9,749  14,020 
1978  9.03  3.79  15,809  9,280  13,857 
1979  13.31  5.89  16,742  8,673  13,975 





















































































































































































'Based on the consumer price index. Inflation and security return data are from Ibbotson and Sinquefeld, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation (Financial 
Analysts Research Foundation, 1977), updated by the authors. 
The  initial capital is $100,000; the annuity is payable with certainty for 10 years; annuity payments are made at the end of  the year; RVis the interest rate 
used to determine the initial level of  the projected stream of annuity payments. 
'Mixed portfolio consists of  bonds (52%). bills (29%), and stocks (19%). 310  Zvi BodieIJames E. Pesando 
is to provide a stable stream of  real benefits, then a VAF must also be 
linked to a bills portfolio. When nominal interest rates are high and the 
valuation rate is low, this VAF will produce results virtually identical to 
those of  a bills-based VA. This is the case for the Rockefeller Foundation 
Plan. In effect, the Rockefeller Foundation Plan functions as a defined- 
benefit  plan  in  the  preretirement  period  and  becomes  a  defined- 
contribution plan at the date of the employee’s retirement. This meta- 
morphosis  of  defined-benefit  plans  into  defined-contribution  plans 
appears to have occurred extensively in Canada and may represent  a 
market response to increased inflation uncertainty. 
Because  the ad hoc  adjustments made by  firms are never  (to our 
knowledge)  more than those  necessary  to offset  fully  the impact  of 
inflation, it is likely that the behavior of many firms is more complicated 
than that suggested by the VAF. We therefore analyze a VA subject to a 
nominal floor and a real ceiling, in which underwriting losses and gains by 
the plan sponsor are banked from one period to the next. Under stylized 
conditions which might well be met in practice, a VAFC tied to bills 
would closely replicate the benefits provided by a bills-based VA. More 
generally, due to the interaction of the floor and ceiling with the banking 
provisions, it is possible for a VAFC to provide substantially more stable 
real benefits than a VA tied to the same asset base. Because the risk- 
return trade-offs available in the capital market have not changed, spon- 
soring firms in these cases would presumably extract compensating wage 
differentials from their employees if mean benefits were unaffected. As 
noted in the text, however, mean benefits will be reduced if  the implicit 
call option (pertaining to the real ceiling) proves to be more valuable than 
the implicit put option (pertaining to the nominal floor). 
Appendix: Description of  Alternative 
Annuity Designs 
Notation 
R,  = nominal rate of  return earned on the fund in year t. 
RV= 
r,  = 
B,  = 
Bo = 
b,  = 
A, = 
interest  rate used  to determine the base  value  of  the annuity 
payment; also called the annuity valuation rate or valuation rate. 
real rate of return earned on the fund in year t. 
nominal benefit payment received at the end of  year t. 
base value of the benefit, i.e., the value of  B, if  R1  = RV. 
real benefit received at the end of  year t. 
nominal value of the amount left in the fund at the end of year t 
after B, is paid out. 311  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
Pt  = Consumer price level at the end of year t with Po set equal to one. 
T  = Number of years the annuity lasts. 
Terms of the Annuities 
For all annuities the base value of  the annuity payment is determined 
by 
B,,  = {  if  RV=O, 
AoRV [l -  (1 + RV)pT]-'  if  RV>O. 
We assume that benefit payments start at the end of the first year, so Bo  is 
not actually paid out but rather serves as the base value for computing the 
first year's  benefit, B1. 
For the standard variable annuity the nominal benefit is 
(1 + R,)  B, = Bt-l 
(1 + RV) 
and the real benefit is 
or 
b, = B,/P,. 
For a nominal annuity R,  is nonstochastic, so 
and the rate of  graduation in the nominal benefit payments is 
Q+R) -1. 
(1 +RV) 
Note that if  RV = R,  we have the conventional level-payment nominal 
annuity. 
For a purchasing power annuity, r, is nonstochastic, so 
b, = h,_l  (1 + 4 
(1 + RV) 
and the rate of  graduation in the real benefit stream is 
U+r) -1, 
(1 +RV) 
For the VAF,  the variable annuity with a nominal floor, the nominal 
benefit is given by 312  Zvi BodieJJames E. Pesando 
(l+  ’,)  if R,  >  RV, 
if  R,% RV, 
(1 + RV)  Bt = 
and the real benefit by 
b, = B,IP,. 
The VAFC,  the variable annuity with a nominal floor and real ceiling, is 
complicated. The benefit calculation follows an iterative procedure that 
can be seen by a simple flowchart (fig. ll.A.l). 
To create an algebraic flowchart, we need some additional notation: 
K, = amount of  money in the “bank”; KO  = 0. 
X, = amount of money available to increase the benefit stream. 
> I  Check this period’s  I  ~ 
I  rate of return, R,  I . 
See whether there is 
enough money available 
benefit exceeds the 
ceiling 
”7 
I  I 
Set bank at zero 
and add amount in 
the bank to the  1 fund  1 
Y 
Keep nominal benefit 
unchanged and borrow 
from the bank enough 
funds to sustain it 
at an assumed rate of 
return of  RV 
Set benefit level equal 
to ceiling value and 
keep the excess funds 
in the bank 
Fig.  ll.A.l  Flowchart showing the iterative procedure 
for calculating benefit stream for a VAFC. 313  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
F,  = present value of a $1 annuity due for T- t + 1  years at an interest 
rate of RV. 
B, = benefit which would be payable in the absence of  the real ceiling. 
The benefit calculation follows the following iterative procedure 
(fig. ll.A.2). 
In the unnumbered table below we demonstrate how the procedure 
works for the VAFC based on the stocks only portfolio reported in table 
Increase t  Increase t 
by 1  If  I  Xtso  I  by 1 
I  I 
4 
I 
(T-t+l)  if  RV=O 
If  B,  >  BOP,  I 
\ 
If  B 
B,  =  BOP, 
Kt= (B,  -  B,P,)F, 
A,=  A,  -  1 (1 +  RV)  +  X, -  B, -  K, 
b,=  B,IP, 
- 
K,  =  X, 
A,=A,-,(l  +RV) -  B, 
b,  =  B,IP, 
5  BOP, 
L 
B,  =  B, 
K,=O 
A, =A,  -  1  +  RV)  +  X, -  B, 
I 
Fig. ll.A.2  Algebraic flowchart showing the iterative procedure 
for calculating benefit stream for a VAFC. 314  Zvi Bodie/James E. Pesando 
11.5. In this  example, A. = $100,000 and RV= .05. We  present  the 
calculation for the first three years only. 
t  R*  P,  xt  F,  BI 
0  .05  1.0000  ...  ...  ,.. 
1971  1  .1431  1.0336  9,310  8.1078  14,099 
1972  2  .1898  1.0688  20,180  7.4632  16,090 
1973  3  -.1466  1.1629  -3,274  6.7864  ... 
...  12,950  0  100,000  12,950 
1971  13,386  13,386  5,781  95,142  12,950 
1972  13,842  13,842  16,774  89,464  12,950 
1973  ...  13,842  -  3,274  80,095  11,903 
Notes 
1. For simplicity, the discussion proceeds as if the retiring plan member's sole source of 
wealth is his claim to aprivate pension. If he has other sources of wealth, then the risk-return 
characteristics of  his pension benefit must be analyzed in the context of his total portfolio. 
See M. Feldstein and L. Summers's chapters in this volume for a discussion of the extent to 
which households may be able to diversify away the inflation risk implicit in nominal pension 
benefits. 
2. A separate provision in the Rockefeller Foundation Plan provides that the cost-of- 
living adjustment equal at least 4% if the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price 
index exceeds 4%. Otherwise, however, the floor is that cited in the text (Heaton 1980). 
There is no reference to a ceiling on the size of the cost-of-living adjustments. Subsequent 
discussion of the Rockefeller plan ignores the separate floor provision. 
3.  TIAA, which manages one of  the largest pension plans in the United States, offers its 
members two annuity designs that resemble VAs containing a nominal floor. The older of 
these, the traditional TIAA annuity, has a guaranteed minimum nominal floor. This floor is 
embodied in the guaranteed return of 3%. Unlike the Rockefeller plan (which is character- 
istic of  the hybrid annuities examined at length in the text), this nominal floor does not 
ratchet  upward over time.  The asset base  in the TIAA annuity consists of  a portfolio 
dominated by long-term bonds, mortgages, and other fixed-interest loans. TIAA pays to its 
beneficiaries a variable benefit which has been smoothed relative to what it would be under a 
standard VA design by ignoring unrealized capital gains and losses on these dollar-fixed 
investments. One  consequence of this smoothing is that the guaranteed rate cited previously 
is far less likely to bind. Another consequence is that there can be cross-subsidization of 
different generations of annuitants. Currently, for example, TIAA is paying a total nominal 
rate of return of 11% to new retirees, while the risk-free nominal rate of return in the capital 
markets is well in excess of that. The  interest rate used to determine the initial benefit (called 
the Assumed Interest Rate, or AIR) is also equal to 11%,  so the expected nominal benefit 
stream is level. Recently, TIAA has offered its members an alternative design (called the 
Graded Benefit Payment Method), which differs in two respects from the older one. First, 
the expected nominal benefit stream has been given an upward tilt by using an AIR of 4% to 315  Retirement Annuity Design in an Inflationary Climate 
determine the initial benefit level. Second, the guaranteed nominal floor ratchets upward 
whenever the interest rate declared in each period actually exceeds 4%. Earnings above 4% 
are credited at the end of the year and-in  effect-are  used to purchase an additional TIAA 
annuity with its own guarantees and dividends. (The interest rate used in calculating the 
increase in the nominal floor is the guaranteed rate of 3%.) It is worth noting that TIAA has 
been shortening the average maturity of its portfolio in recent years. If this process were to 
continue, the TIAA graded-payment annuity would come to look more like the Rockefeller 
plan annuity. 
4.  Ontario's  Select Committee on Pensions (1981) has recommended that the use of 
excess investment earnings to provide inflation protection be mandated by law. No refer- 
ence is made to floors and/or ceilings in the proposed scheme, which the analysis in this 
chapter shows to be of  crucial importance. 
5.  For the purposes at hand, there is no advantage in explicitly incorporating mortality 
factors into the analysis. Mortality is thus ignored in all of the illustrations presented in this 
chapter. 
6.  More precisely, each year's real benefit would be equal to the previous year's benefit 
divided by  1.05. 
7.  In fact, real equity returns appear to be negatively correlated with unanticipated 
inflation, as noted by Bodie (1976) and Pesando and Rea (1977). 
8. The mixed portfolio consists of  52% bonds, 29% bills, and 19% stocks. We do not 
refer to this as an efficient portfolio far two reasons. First, our portfolio proportions are 
derived  from a single-period variance-minimization  procedure  which ignores the serial 
correlation in bill returns. Second, the efficiency  of an annuity for a particular household can 
only be determined if  we know all of  the household's other assets and liabilities. 
9. As noted by Bodie (1982), the mean realized real return on bonds is negative during 
this period. The mean real return on bonds was set equal to an annual rate of 370, whose 
continuous  time equivalent  is  2.956%,  while  the  other parameters were  based  on the 
observed means, variances, and covariances. 
10. First-order  autoregressions were performed for the logarithms of  the real annual 
wealth relatives of  bills, bonds, and stocks. The results are as follows: 
Bills:  r, = -  ,044  + .768 T,+~,  R2  = ,559, SEE = 1.04 (% per year); 
Bonds:  r,= -1.619  + .261 T,+~,  R2 = ,056, SEE = 7.64; 
Stocks: r,=  5.847  -  ,021 r,-, ,  RZ  = ,0004, SEE = 19.28 
(.205)  (.  136) 
(1.493)  (.207) 
(3.849)  (.201) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
~ 
11. The real benefit in year  r  is given by  b,= B0 n:=,[e"/(l+  RV)], where B0 is the 
initial projected annuity payment, T,is the realization of the stochastic logarithic real return 
in year i, and RVis the annuityvaluation rate. Since b,is the product of lognormalvariates, it 
is also lognormally distributed: log (b,) = log (B,) + C:=  T, -  t log (1 + RV). Because we 
have chosen RVsuch that E(r,)  = log (1 + RV), the median value of b, equals Bo  for all f. By 
contrast, the mean value of  b, = B,e'/z": where u:equals  the variance of H:=,  7,.  If  there is no 
serial correlation in the F,  series, u:=  fu2 where u2  is the variance of  r, in a single year. 
Rea (1981) also discusses the design of  a variable annuity which produces a payments 
stream which is expected to remain constant in real terms. 
12. The first-order annual autoregression,  based on the consumer price index, is 
mr= .794 + .902~r+~,R*  = ,750, SEE = 2.003 (% per year), 
(.597)  (.117) 
where 71,  = log (P,/P,+  and P, is the price level at time t. 316  Zvi Bodie/James E. Pesando 
13. Assume P, follows the first-order autoregressivc process,  IT^ =  CY + p?r-  +  E,, where 
E, is distributed N(0,  a).  Then TI* = a/(]  -  p) is the steady-state rate of  inflation. Note that 
log (P,) = log (Po)  + Z:=, G, where P, is the realization of  the inflation process. Let P,, = 1 
and let no  = P*.  Then median of  log (P,) = fn*;  median of  P, = e'"';  and variance of 
If B, is the known nominal benefit in period t,  then the real benefit b, = B,/P,. Thus log (b,) 
= log(B,)  -  log(P,).  Let  B, = B&',  where  g  is  the  rate  of  graduation,  and  let 
p, = (g -,~*)t.  Median b, = B, t  median P, = BoeF'.  Since B,is graduated so as  to  increase at 
the  anticipated  inflation  rate,  pr=O and  median  b,= Bc,. Since  B,  is  nonstochastic, 
variance  of  log (b,) =  variance  of  log (P,) = u:.  Mean b, = B,,eW':  and the variance  of 
b, = Bie"f(e"f- 1). 
14. The continuously compounded nominal interest rate (R)  is thus equivalent  to an 
annual rate of  1 I%,  since the (annual) steady-state  rate of inflation built into the illustration 
is 8%. 
15.  If  there were no nominal  floor on the pension  benefits.  any decision to channel 
pension fund reserves exclusively into bills or their equivalent would have an unambiguous 
interpretation. Workers. who presumably cannot diversify away the inflation risk inherent 
in nominal pension benefits, are sufficiently risk averse that they will pay the price (i.e., a 
low expected real  return  on their pension  wealth)  of  stabilizing  their real  retirement 
incomes. 
16. Remember that the standard deviation of  the continuously compounded real bill 
return is only 1.52% per annum, so that the expected real  return of  zero is about two 
standard deviations less than 3%. 
17. The plan sponsor could underwrite VAFs or VAFCs on either a pay-as-you-go or a 
fully funded basis. This issue is not explored in this chapter. 
18. If the sponsor provides a defincd-benefit plan, the lump sum necessary to purchase 
the requisite annuity could be made available to the employee, who could then choose his 
preferred VA. If the promised pension is purely nominal (and the firm has no tradition of 
providing ad hoc adjustments), then discounting the promised payments by the risk-free 
nominal rate R (as well as by mortality) would identify the lump sum to be offered to the 
employee. 
Comment  Franco Modigliani 
Among all the institutions in the financial sphere of  the economy, prob- 
ably none is more seriously affected by inflation than private pensions. 
This impact does not merely reflect the redistribution from creditors to 
debtors that is generally supposed to accompany inflation. Indeed, redis- 
tribution need not occur at all to the extent that inflation is fully antici- 
pated and is accompanied by an offsetting rise in nominal rates. But the 
pension contract, just like the fully amortized mortgage, stands to be 
drastically distorted by inflation even if  it is largely or fully anticipated, 
because both contracts were designed in nominal terms for a world of 
stable prices. 
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The typical defined-benefit pension plan was designed to provide the 
pensioner with a level fixed real payment, equal to some fraction of  his 
pay in the neighborhood of his retirement date, reflecting the number of 
years of  service. In the absence of inflation, that intended goal is achieved 
by awarding to the annuitant a fixed nominal pension, at the appropriate 
level, for the rest of his life. 
But in the presence of inflation this arrangement turns out to produce 
results which are quite different and less favorable from the point of view 
of  the beneficiary than the intended ones, in three distinct ways: (1) 
though the stream of benefits starts at the intended level, its purchasing 
power will thereafter be reduced by the rise in the price level caused by 
inflation-the  higher the inflation over the retirement period, the smaller 
the aggregate real value of benefits received by the pensioner; (2) the 
existence of inflation means that the real income stream from the pension 
received by the annuitant continuously decreases in time, and the ben- 
eficiary gets poorer at a rate which is faster the larger the rate of inflation, 
whether inflation is anticipated or not; and (3) if, as is usually the case, 
there is uncertainty about the future path of inflation, then the path of 
real  benefits  is  not  only  lowered  and  tilted  down, but  also becomes 
uncertain. 
Consequence 1 seems to have largely escaped notice, in part perhaps 
because it would not be expected to arise for a defined-contribution plan. 
As for the remaining two, it is sometimes suggested that a rational and 
prudent beneficiary could readily avoid them by saving a portion of his 
annuity in the early part of his retirement and thus accumulating reserves 
to be used to support consumption above the annuity in the later part of 
his life. But this suggestion clearly has very little merit. Given the uncer- 
tainty about the future inflation, it would be difficult for the pensioner to 
make adequate reserves for the future. Furthermore, even if he did know 
the future inflation, he would still not know the time of  his death and 
therefore the appropriate amount of reserves to make. To put it another 
way,  any  reserves  he might  accumulate would  not  benefit  from  the 
insurance against the risk of  life which is an essential feature of  a life 
annuity. 
These three problems, particularly problems 2 and 3, could be effec- 
tively and easily handled if  there existed in the market “indexed” instru- 
ments which offered the lender a constant “real rate” over the life of the 
loan, e.g., by paying a fixed rate on a principal whose nominal value was 
periodically revalued so as to maintain a constant purchasing power, or, 
equivalently, by promising a floating nominal rate equal to a constant 
(the real rate) plus the rate of inflation. Such instruments would enable 
the pension  fund, by  investing  in  them in  appropriate amounts and 
maturities, to provide the annuitant with an indexed nominal annuity 
which would guarantee a constant real level of benefits based on the fixed 
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Of  course that real rate would, presumably, be lower than the going 
nominal rate for corresponding maturities, to an extent reflecting antici- 
pated inflation over the life of  the instruments. This means that to provide 
a benefit rate at the same  initial level as  without inflation would require an 
accumulation higher than that needed at present on the basis of inflation- 
swollen nominal rates-though  presumably no higher than would have 
been called for in the absence of inflation. 
This simple solution is, unfortunately,  not available at present since 
indexed bonds, or similar indexed instruments, cannot be purchased in 
the market, nor are they likely to be readily available in the foreseeable 
future. The chapter by Bodie and Pesando makes a valuable contribution 
by describing and testing a number of  alternative arrangements which, 
even in the absence of  indexed assets, could ensure the annuitant an 
outcome similar to that which would have occurred with stable prices-a 
constant level payment in real terms through his life. Ideally the result 
should be achieved with no, or little, change in the magnitude and nature 
of  the risk borne by the provider of the annuity. 
Bodie and Pesando focus on a number of  solutions, most of  which are 
variants of one basic design-a  design which also provided the basis for 
proposed solutions to the mortgage problem, as set out in the M.I.T. 
study, “New Mortgage Designs for Stable Housing in  an Inflationary 
Environment  .” 
Focusing for simplicity of exposition on the case in which the annuitant 
receives an annuity certain of, say, t years, as the authors themselves do, 
this basic design can be summarized as follows. First, the nominal annuity 
is recomputed at regular prearranged intervals, say yearly, by applying to 
the annuitant’s endowment remaining at the beginning of the period, the 
standard annuity formula, for a number of years equal to the remaining 
life of  the annuity, and using a fixed, agreed interest rate (which the 
authors call the valuation rate, RV).  Second, the endowment remaining 
to the annuitant at any point is invested in some stated instrument, for 
example, T-bills or long-term bonds or corporate equities, and so on. 
Third, the endowment remaining at the beginning of  any period is com- 
puted by taking the endowment of  the previous period, crediting to the 
annuitant the return from the investment in the chosen asset, and sub- 
tracting the annuity paid in that period. In the case of a life annuity, the 
procedure would be essentially the same except that in the first step one 
would rely on the life annuity formula with an interest rate RV. 
It is clear that under this plan the annuity actually received by the 
beneficiary in nominal terms (or, for that matter, in real terms) will vary 
from period to period-hence  the name of  “variable annuity,” or VA. 
But it can be shown that the real path of the annuity, over the life of  the 
contract, satisfies one  basic recursive relation. This relation, which can be 
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stated as follows: the real annuity (at the end) of year t is equal to that of 
the year t -  1  multiplied by the factor (1 +  i, -  p$(l  + RV),  where i, is 
the nominal rate of return on the chosen investment and pt is the rate of 
inflation in year t. 
To see the implications of  this type of arrangement, suppose first there 
existed some instrument whose nominal return could be counted on to be 
always equal to a constant plus the rate of  inflation-or equivalently, 
whose real return was a constant. It is apparent that, by choosing that 
instrument as the investment vehicle and by choosing for RV the constant 
real rate, one would be able to guarantee the beneficiary an annuity 
which would remain constant in real terms at the initial level throughout 
the duration of the contract-that  is, in effect, a fully indexed pension. 
Suppose next the endowment were invested in an instrument whose 
real return in each period was uncertain but which fluctuated around a 
known expected value. If  RV  is set equal to this expected return, the 
result is a variable annuity, which, in real terms, would tend to fluctuate 
around the initial level, with a variability around that value depending 
both on the variability and the serial correlation of the real return on the 
instrument. If, on the other hand, RV was chosen to exceed the expected 
real return, then the annual payment  could  be expected to fluctuate 
around a path declining at a rate equal to  the difference between RV and 
the expected real return. Conversely, the choice of RV below the ex- 
pected real return would lead to a path of expected payments rising in 
time. 
Thus, by relying on different possible assets as the investment vehicle 
and by appropriate choice of RV, one can construct a whole family of 
variable annuities differing from each other in terms of the expected real 
average outcome, in terms of  the variability of possible outcomes around 
that level, and in terms of tilt of the real payment path. From finance 
theory and empirical evidence, one would generally expect that instru- 
ments offering a higher expected return, and thus promising a higher 
expected average level, would also be characterized by greater variability 
of  the outcome path and also greater uncertainty of the average outcome 
over finite periods.  These inferences are supported by  the results re- 
ported by Bodie and Pesando for a variety  of  alternative investment 
vehicles. 
It is widely supposed that very short-term loans of high quality, such as 
short-term Treasury bills, tend to yield fairly stable real returns, year 
after year, more stable than any other standard instrument. This view 
receives striking confirmation in Bodie and Pesando’s tests. The results 
reported in table 11.2 suggest that a VA based on the one-month Trea- 
sury bill could be expected to provide a remarkably stable annual real 
payment. Relying on the parameters of  the observed  distribution of 
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of  the annual payment is but 5% of  the mean after 5 years and remains 
below 15% even after 15 years. Equally impressive are the results of table 
11.5, which reports the annual payments that would actually have been 
realized for the 10-year period from 1971 to 1980. Even in this troubled 
period the largest deviation from the starting level is just about 10%. 
Unfortunately  this highly desirable stability obtained with the Treasury 
bill as the investment vehicle is acquired at the cost of an extremely low 
real return which, for the period 1953-80,  is actually estimated at zero. 
For the more recent period 1971-80  the real return is even negative in 
most years and on the average for the period as a whole, and as a result 
the real annuity drifts down, even though RV is taken as zero. 
The authors have tested several other investment vehicles and notably 
bonds, stocks and a mixed portfolio consisting of bonds, stocks, and bills 
designed to minimize variance for the given mean. Relying on the 1953- 
80 experience, these other instruments imply considerably higher initial 
and expected average annual payments, but at a cost of an impressively 
larger variability of outcomes. In the case of common stock for instance, 
the expected annual payment is 70% larger than in the case of Treasury 
bills, but  the standard deviation goes up by  15 times! Even with  the 
minimum risk portfolio, the level of expected return goes up by but a 
quarter, while the standard deviation increases by  a factor of  200%- 
300%. 
As shown in table 11.5,  the relative attractiveness of these alternative 
instruments would have been even lower during the seventies, because 
the average  return was  in  all cases substantially  below  the historical 
performance, used in table 11.2. Indeed, the average return was lower 
than that of T-bills, the only exception being stocks, where the difference 
was not very large. Thus, in addition to the great variability of annual 
returns exhibited  by  these types of  VAs, the annuitant would  have 
suffered from a markedly declining overall trend if R V had been chosen 
at a level around the historical return of each asset. In the case of common 
stock, for instance, it can be seen from the simulation of table 11.5 that 
even using an RVof 5%, somewhat below the historical average of 7%, 
the annual payment tends to  fall by around 40% of its initial level by the 
end of the period. Incidentally, the results of this particular simulation-a 
VA backed by common stocks with an RV equal to 5%-is  of particular 
interest since it provides a good approximation to the outcome of the only 
type of  VA that was actually in existence during the seventies. This was 
the VA backed by the portfolio of CREF, for which a value of RV of 4% 
was used-quite  close to the 5% assumed in the table. It is apparent that 
the experience with this instrument was hardly a satisfactory one and that 
arrangements  of  this type should not be forced on annuitants  without also 
giving them the option of a less risky alternative such as that consisting of 
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Bodie and Pesando have  also explored  a few other possible  plans 
which, however, do not strike me as promising. The first is the so-called 
graduated payment plan in which the nominal annuity increases through 
time at some prearranged rate, intended to match the inflation rate. I 
have serious objection to graduation for pensions, as I do for mortgages. 
A graduated annuity is still a nominal contract, which cannot be counted 
on to eliminate much of  the risk of  the real outcome when inflation is 
highly variable. Table 11.2  shows that the graduated payment produces a 
standard deviation of  real outcomes roughly twice as large as that pro- 
duced by a T-bill-backed VA, even though it is assumed that the gradua- 
tion exactly coincides with the rate of  inflation over the period of  the 
contract. In practice it would be impossible to match the two closely, 
especially in the case of  long contracts. Thus, while the graduation may 
somewhat reduce the tilt associated with a conventional pension, it might 
also  conceivably  increase  it  if  inflation  turned out to be sufficiently 
smaller than the graduation rate. 
Finally, Bodie aild Pesando have considered the possibility of  reducing 
some of the risk that is borne by the annuitant under a variable annuity by 
giving him a guarantee that his nominal annuity will never decline, along 
the lines of the so-called Rockefeller plan. But, as the authors recognize, 
this guarantee would be nonoperational  for the kind of T-bill-backed VA 
which strikes me as the most feasible arrangement. At least if RVis taken 
as zero, as would seem appropriate, there is no possibility of the nominal 
annuity received by the beneficiary ever declining, except if the bill rate 
itself were negative, which presumably is impossible. Even if RV was 
taken  as 3%, as seems to be the case  in  the Rockefeller  plan, the 
probability of  the nominal rate falling short of  3% seems remote in a 
period of high inflation. If, on the other hand, inflation should become 
even lower or somewhat negative, then it is very questionable whether 
there should be a clause guaranteeing the annuitant against a decline in 
the nominal payments. 
Another possibility considered in this chapter is that of  a ceiling on the 
real level of  the annuity with the returns earned by the endowment of the 
annuitant and not paid to him, returned to the pension fund as a com- 
pensation for the risk it is taking in guaranteeing a floor. I have already 
indicated why I do not regard a floor as a very interesting modification, 
and there seems to be no justification left for a ceiling either. 
As the authors explicitly recognize, the several alternatives explored in 
this chapter by no means exhaust all possible designs, but I share their 
view that those examined are by and large the most promising. There is, 
nonetheless,  one more class that deserves brief mention, namely, the 
class of  arrangements that gives the annuitant an option to switch from 
one instrument to another or from one type of  plan to another in the 
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stock-backed  and bill-backed  VAs  but  also  between  either of  these 
instruments  and short-term fixed graduation. For instance, the annuitant 
could elect to invest in, say, a 3-year nominal instrument choosing simul- 
taneously a lower value for RV with the difference reflecting the expected 
inflation over the next 3 years. This instrument produces, for the initial 3 
years, a sure nominal stream with a fixed graduation at a rate equal to the 
difference  between  the nominal  rate and RV, and hence  related  to 
expected inflation. At the end of  3 years, the annuitant would have an 
opportunity of choosing another intermediate-term  graduation consist- 
ent with inflation expected then, but he could also switch to some other 
form of  contract. 
Quite generally, I see merits in giving the annuitant as large a choice of 
instruments and as wide an opportunity to switch between them as is 
consistent with administrative costs and with his ability to acquire a full 
understanding of  alternatives open to him. 
Let me conclude by  congratulating Bodie  and Pesando for having 
provided us with an extremely useful analysis which, one may hope, will 
contribute  to significantly advancing the case for a pension design consist- 
ent with an inflationary environment. 
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